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Secret Sharing techniques are now the building blocks of several security protocols. A (t,n) threshold secret sharing scheme
is one in which t or more participant can join together to retrieve the secret.Traditional single secret sharing schemes are modi-
fied and generalized to share multiple secrets.Use of elliptic curve and pairing in secret sharing is gaining more importance.In
this paper we propose a threshold multi secret sharing scheme where more than one secret is shared.When the threshold number
of participants collate, the multi secret can be retrieved. The scheme make use of elliptic curve and bilinear pairing.Verification
of shares by the participants, shares consistency checking, detection and identification of cheaters are the extended capabilities
achieved.The shared secrets are retrieved in single stage here, unlike the multi stage secret sharing scheme.The participants
can be added very easily.The scheme is efficient and the number of public parameters are also less compared with the existing
threshold multi secret sharing scheme based on the elliptic curve.The dealer can easily modify the secret or add additional
secret by changing the public parameters of the scheme.This is the first proposal of a threshold multi secret sharing scheme
with extended capabilities using self pairing.
Keywords : Cheater Identification,Elliptic Curve, Multi-secret Sharing,Pairing, Secret Sharing.
1. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is an important technique used for
secret management .Securing secret key is very im-
portant for the proper execution of security proto-
cols.The key idea comes from the problem of secure
key storage by Shamir [46] and Blakley [5], how-
ever secret sharing schemes have found numerous
other applications in cryptography, secret key agree-
ment,visual cryptography, threshold encryption, dis-
tributed computing etc [13] [41] [2] [9] [11] [20]
[4][55] [47][40].
Both Shamir’s and Blakley’s proposals are (t,n)
threshold secret sharing schemes. The secret is shared
among n users and t or more users can recover the
secret by pooling their shares.Different proposals of
threshold schemes are made using linear algebra,
number theory, matroids, block codes etc [1] [28]
[35] [38] [31] [7] [51].But Shamir’s scheme was the
most prominent because it offers perfect security and
is flexible.The scheme is based on Lagrange Interpo-
lation. There are also efficient O(nlog2n) algorithms
which can be used for the easy implementation of
Shamir’s scheme.
Extended capabilities are added to threshold
schemes in the later stages.A generalized secret shar-
ing scheme is one where any authorized subset of par-
ticipants is able to recover the shared secret by pool-
ing their shares.These authorized subset is called the
access structure of the scheme. The most efficient and
easy to implement scheme was Ito, Saito, Nishizeki’s
construction [25].The major issue with generalized
secret secret sharing scheme is the share size or the
number of shares each participant has to store corre-
sponds to each authorized access structure.Some of
the proposals for the generalized secret sharing can
be found in [3] [7] [53] [26] [34].
Cheater identification and detection, share verifica-
tion are the major security requirement in secret shar-
ing scheme.Each participant must be able to check
the validity of the shares submitted by other partic-
ipants during the reconstruction phase and also the
shares distributed by the Dealer in the share distri-
bution phase.Verifiable and Publicly Verifiable Secret
Sharing(PVSS) schemes are proposed in this regard
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where not only the participant but any one can pub-
licly verify the validity and consistency of the shares
distributed by the Dealer.Dynamic ,proactive secret
sharing etc made the schemes more flexible and error
free.Tompa and Wall stated that Shamir’s scheme is
not cheating resistant and they proposed a scheme for
detecting cheaters [58].Signature based schemes are
also proposed for identifying cheaters [44].Verifiable
Secret Sharing(VSS) is proposed by Benny Chor et
al [2].Several non interactive and interactive schemes
are proposed for verification [2] [17] [43].Schemes
for the identification of cheaters are also proposed
[22] [61].Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing schemes
are proposed by Stadler [52]. Several improvements
are suggested in [19] [45].An information theoretic
secure PVSS is proposed in [54].The use of Elliptic
Curve and Pairing for PVSS is proposed by [62].
Multi secret sharing is a new idea where several
secrets are shared.Multiple secrets are shared among
several users and when the authorized set of partic-
ipant collate, they will be able to recover multiple
secrets.This provides more flexibility. Each partic-
ipant will hold a single share and the same share
can be used to retrieve multiple secrets.The shared
secrets and the threshold can also be changed dy-
namically but the same share can be used for the re-
trieval of multi secrets.Identification of cheaters and
public verification of the shares make multi secret
sharing scheme suitable for several applications in
cloud.There are several proposals in the literature
dealing with threshold multi secret sharing and gener-
alized multi secret sharing.Most of the schemes make
use of a public notice board where the dealer will pub-
lish public parameters needed for the secret recon-
struction and verification.Multiple secrets are recon-
structed using the shares of the participants and also
using the global public values from the notice board.
Karnin, Greene and Hellman [28] in 1983 men-
tioned the multiple secret sharing scheme.The scheme
can be used to share a large secret by splitting it
into smaller shares.Franklin et al [18], in 1992 used
a technique in which the polynomial-based single se-
cret sharing is modified, where multiple secrets are
kept hidden in a single polynomial.These schemes
are not perfect and are also one time use scheme.
That is once the shares are used for secret reconstruc-
tion, they are exposed and cannot be used again. He
and Dawson [23] suggested a multistage secret shar-
ing scheme in 1994.The implementation is based on
Shamir’s threshold scheme and a one way function
which is hard to invert.The secrets are reconstructed
stage by stage in particular order.This scheme needs
k× n public values corresponds to the k secrets.In
1995 Harn [21] came up with an alternative imple-
mentation of multi stage secret sharing which requires
only k×(n−t) public values.In 2000, Chien et al [10]
proposed a (t,n) multi-secret sharing scheme based
on the systematic block codes. Yang et al [63] pro-
posed an alternative scheme based on Shamir’s se-
cret sharing in 2004 ( YCH scheme ), which reduce
the complexity of the secret reconstruction in Chien’s
scheme. But there are more public values required in
Yang’s scheme than in Chien’s scheme when p < t.
Motivated by these concerns, a new (t,n) multi-secret
sharing scheme is proposed by Pang and Wang [42]
,in 2004 .The scheme is as easy as Yang’s scheme in
the secret reconstruction and requires same number of
public values as Chien’s scheme.Chao-Wen Chan et
al [8] proposed a multi-secret sharing scheme based
on CRT and polynomial.Verifiability in multisecret
sharing is implemented in[49],[65],[12].Hash func-
tion based multi-secret sharing are proposed recently
by Javier Herranz et al [24] and Jun Shao [48].
Elliptic curves were found numerous applications
in cryptography [39]. Developed as a public key
crypto system, it is found more secure with small
key size compared with other public key crypto sys-
tem.The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
(ECDLP) is much harder compared with the Discrete
Logarithm Problem(DLP).The Elliptic curve group
provides better security with smaller key size so the
computational cost can be reduced while maintain-
ing the same level of security.In 1993 Meneze’s et al
[36] introduced pairing.Pairing is introduced to show
an attack on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
and later found useful applications.Pairing on ellip-
tic curve have found useful applications in identity
based encryption, threshold cryptography and signa-
ture schemes, multi party key exchange etc [14].The
use of elliptic curve and pairing have found applica-
tions in secret sharing schemes very recently.Several
schemes based on threshold and generalized secret
sharing is proposed and they have found useful appli-
cations.Pairing can be used to introduce verifiability
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in secret sharing scheme with more security.
Chen Wei et al [60] proposed a dynamic thresh-
old secret sharing scheme using bilinear maps in
2007.Each participant holds a permanent private
key.The specified threshold is realized by adjusting
the number of linear equations.The scheme is also
having cheating detection capability.It is a single se-
cret sharing scheme.A threshold multi secret shar-
ing scheme based on ECDLP is proposed by Run-
hua Shi et al.[50] in 2007.A fast multi-scalar mul-
tiplication scheme is also introduced.Sharing multi-
ple secrets which are represented as points on elliptic
curve using self pairing is proposed by Liu et al [33]
in 2008.The proposed scheme is based on Liu et al
scheme.Chen’s scheme is modified to share multiple
secrets by S.J.Wang et al [59] in 2009.In Wang’s et
al scheme, the number of secrets must be less than
or equal to the threshold and also more public val-
ues must be modified when the secret need to be up-
dated.Eslami et al [15] in 2010 proposed a modified
scheme which avoids these problems.
Several publicly verifiable secret sharing schemes
are proposed based on pairing, but most of them are
single secret sharing schemes. Youliang Tian et al
[57] in 2008 proposed a practical publicly verifiable
secret sharing scheme.A pairing based PVSS is intro-
duced by Wu and Tseng [62] in 2011.An efficient ver-
ifiable secret sharing scheme is proposed by Jie Zhang
et al [64].Tian et al [56] mentioned a distributed PVSS
scheme.An efficient One Stage Multi Secret Shar-
ing(OSMSS) is proposed recently in 2014 by Fatemi
et al, [16].The scheme makes use of bilinear pairing.
The number of public values are also reduced and the
scheme is comparatively more efficient.
In section 2 details about elliptic curve pairing is
mentioned.Section 3 explains the Liu et al [33] point
sharing algorithm on elliptic curve.Section 4 explains
the modified algorithm. Experimental results and
conclusions are given in section 5 and 6.
2. ELLIPTIC CURVE AND PAIRING
Elliptic curves appear in the implementation of
many diverse areas of cryptographic protocols.The
discrete logarithm problem is more harder in ellip-
tic curve field.The Elliptic Curve Cryptography(ECC)
has found applications in devices with low power and
memory.The Elliptic curve cryptography was intro-
duced by Koblitz [29] and Miller [39].An efficient im-
plementation ECC is proposed by Menezes et al [37].
An elliptic curve E defined over GF(q) is given
by y2 = x3 +Ax+ B, where ∆ = 4A3 + 27B2 is non
zero.This ensures that the curve is non singular and
has distinct roots.By adding a additional point point
at infinity (O) it forms an additive algebraic group.So
E is given by
E = {(x,y) : y2 = x3 +Ax+B}∪{O}
The addition law makes points on elliptic curve into a
commutative group.
Suppose we want to add two points P1 = (x1,y1)
and P2 = (x2,y2).Let the line connecting P1 and P2 to
be
L : y = λ x+ v
The slope and y intercept of the line is given by
λ =
{ y2−y1
x2−x1 , if P1 6= P2.
3x21+A
2y1 , if P1 = P2.
v = y1−λ x1.
and let
x3 = λ 2− x1− x2. and y3 = λ (x1− x3)− y1.
Then P1 + P2 = (x3,y3). Elliptic curves are applied
to cryptography by considering the points whose co-
ordinate belongs to a finite field Fp.We can define an
elliptic curve E : Y 2 = X3 + AX +B with A,B ∈ Fp
and then look for the points on E with coordinates
in Fp. The addition law satisfies all the properties
and makes E(Fp) into a field.The Discrete Logarithm
Problem(DLP) in Fp, for a cyclic multiplicative group
can be applied to Elliptic curve additive group.The El-
liptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem(ECDLP) is
defined as follows.
Definition 1 Let E be an elliptic curve over the finite
field.Define two points Fp and P and Q in E(Fp). The
ECDLP is the problem of finding an integer n such
that Q = nP.The integer n is denoted by
n = logP(Q)
and n is the elliptic curve discrete logarithm of Q with
respect to P.
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The index calculus method having sub exponential
running time solves the DLP in Fp.However there are
no known general algorithms that solve ECDLP in
fewer than O(√p) steps.That is ECDLP is much more
difficult than the DLP.
Pairing on elliptic curves have a number of im-
portant cryptographic applications.It is first used
for cryptanalysis.The discrete logarithm problem is
solved by using MOV algorithm [30].The pairings
technique have since been used to construct many
cryptographic systems for which no other efficient
implementation is known, such as identity based
encryption or attribute based encryption [14].The
mapping allows development of new cryptographic
schemes based on the reduction of one problem in
one group to a different, usually easier problem in
the other group.The first group is usually called GAP
Group where the Decisional Diffie Hellman problem
(DDHP) [6] is easy,but the Computational Diffie Hell-
man (CDHP) problem remains hard. Let G be a cyclic
additive group generated by P whose order is prime
q.For all a,b,c ∈ Z∗q.The CDHP is, given P,aP,bP
compute abP.DDHP is defined as, given P,aP,bP,cP,
decide whether c = ab in Z∗q.
The important pairing based construct is the bi-
linear pairing.Lets consider two groups of the same
prime order q and the DLP is hard in both the
groups.A mapping from (G1 =< P >,+) to (G2, .) is
called Bilinear Maps, if the following conditions are
satisfied.
1. Bilinearity:∀P,Q ∈G1,∀a,b ∈ Z∗q
e(aP,bQ) = e(P,Q)ab
2. Non-Degeneracy: If everything maps to the
identity, that’s obviously not interesting
∀P ∈ G1,P 6= 0⇒< e(P,P)>= G2
(e(P,P)generatesG2)
In other words:
P 6= 0⇒ e(P,P) 6= 1
3. Computability: e is efficiently com-
putable.i.e., there is a polynomial time algo-
rithm to compute e(P,Q) ∈ G2, for all P,Q ∈
G1.
We can find G1 and G2 where these properties hold.
The Weil and Tate provides pairings constructions
in these groups.These pairing have found numerous
cryptographic applications [27].Typically, G1 is an el-
liptic curve group and G2 is a finite field.
A self pairing and its applications are proposed
by Lee [32] in 2004.The pairing which map e : G×
G =⇒ G is called self pairing.
Let K be a field with characteristic zero or a prime
p and E = E( ¯K) be an elliptic curve over ¯K, where
¯K is an algebraic closure of K.Consider the set of all
torsion points of order l that is set of points P with
lP = O.These points forms a subgroup EK [l] of E(K),
where l 6= 0.E[l] can be represented as a direct sum
of two cyclic groups. E[l] ∼= Zl ⊕ Zl . That is, any
point in E[l] can be represented as a linear combi-
nation of two generating pair G and H.Consider the
points P = r1G + s1H and Q = r2G + s2H in E[l],
where r1,r2,s1, and s2 are integers in [0, l−1].We can
define pairing for some fixed integers, α,β ∈ [0, l−1],
in the following way
eα ,β : E[l]×E[l] =⇒ E[l]
eα ,β : (r1s2− r2s1)(αG+β H)
The trivial case when α,β are zero is excluded.
Proposition 1 :The pairing eα ,β : E[l]×E[l]→ E[l]
will satisfy the properties mentioned below
(i) Identity: For all A ∈ E[l],eα ,β (A,A) = O
(ii) Bilinearity: For all A,B,C ∈ E[l]
eα ,β (A+B,C) = eα ,β (A,C)+ eα ,β (B,C)
eα ,β (A,B+C) = eα ,β (A,B)+ eα ,β (A,C)
(iii) Anti-symmetry: For all A,B ∈ E[l],eα ,β (A,B) =
−eα ,β (B,A)
(iv) Non-degeneracy: If A ∈ E[l],eα ,β (A,O) =
O .More over if eα ,β (A,B) = O for all B ∈ E[l]
then P = O .
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3. LIU’S SCHEME
Liu et al[33] made the first proposal on sharing
points in elliptic curve. In this scheme multiple se-
crets K1,K2, . . . ,Km are shared and are represented
as points on the Elliptic curve.The scheme consist of
four main steps.
1. Initialization.
2. Share Distribution.
3. Secret Sharing.
4. Secret Reconstruction.
The initialization and share distribution phase need to
be done only once for a particular (t,n) secret shar-
ing scheme, where t is the threshold.Secret can be
dynamically changed or more secret can be added
with out modifying the participants secret share.This
is achieved with a public notice board where every
user have the access, but only the dealer can modify
the data.
3.1. Initialization
It is assumed that the dealer is a trusted authority
and the participants U1,U2, . . . ,Un are honest.In the
initialization phase some public parameters are posted
on the public bulletin called notice board which can
be accessed by every participant.
1. The Dealer(D) chooses an Elliptic curve E over
GF(q),q = pr, where p is a large prime such
that DLP and ECDLP in GF(q) is hard. D then
choose E[l] ⊆ E(GF(qk)), a torsion subgroup
of large prime order l.
2. D chooses a generating pair {G,H} ∈ E[l] ,
α,β , which is used for pairing and compute
W = α.G+β .H
3. D then publish {E,q, l,k,W} in the notice
board.
3.2. Share Distribution
In this phase, shares are generated and are dis-
tributed to n participants.Any t of them can recon-
struct the secret. These shares are independent of the
secret to be distributed.
1. D generate a matrix A of size n× t as:
A =


1 1 1 . . . 1
1 2 22 . . . 2t−1
1 3 32 . . . 3t−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 n n2 . . . nt−1


2. D randomly choose t pairs of numbers
ai′,bi′ ∈ [1, l− 1],1≤ i≤ t and computes
(a1,a2, . . . ,an)
T = A.(a1′,a2′, . . . ,at ′)T
(b1,b2, . . . ,bn)T = A.(b1′,b2′, . . . ,bt ′)T
3. D sends Pj = {a j,b j} as a secret share to each
user U j,1≤ j ≤ n through a secure channel.
3.3. Secret Sharing
After distributing the secret shares, the dealer will
share multi-secret by publishing informations on a
public notice board corresponding to each secret to be
shared.Each participant can make use of these public
values. These public information together with the
secret share of each participant can be used for the re-
trieval of shared secrets.The number of secrets m must
be less than or equal to the threshold t for the scheme
to work.
1. The secrets to be shared ie; K1,K2, . . . ,Km is
mapped into m points on the Elliptic curve
M1,M2, . . . ,Mm.
2. D chooses {ci,di} ∈ [0, l − 1] randomly
and computes Qi = ci.G + di.H and Ri =
eα ,β (Qi,Pi′)+Mi, for all 1≤ i≤m.
3. D then publish {ci,di,Ri},1 ≤ i ≤ m, on the
public bulletin.
3.4. Secret Reconstruction
Let t users U1,U2, . . . ,Ut wants to reconstruct m se-
crets.Each user contribute his pseudo share for the re-
construction of secret.The pseudo share is computed
from his secret share and the public informations.
For each secret Ki from 1 to m and for each user U j
from 1 to t
1. Each U j download the pair {ci,di} from the
public bulletin and compute pseudo share
SSi j = eα ,β (Qi,Pj), where Pj = a j.G + b j.H
and Qi = ci.G+ di.H, 1≤ i≤ t and 1≤ j ≤ t.
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2. Each user U j multi-casts the pseudo share Si j to
other t− 1 participants.
3. Each user then computes Ti = ∑tk=1 yk.Si j,
where yk = ∏tj=1, j 6=k(k− j))−1.
4. Each user can download the point Ri from the
public bulletin and recovers Mi = Ri−Ti.
4. PROPOSED SCHEME
The major difficulties with Liu’s scheme is that
the secrets are represented as points on the ellip-
tic curve.The mapping of secret to the elliptic curve
point is very difficult.The number of secrets that can
be shared also depends on the threshold t.We cannot
share more than t secrets.The Dealer is assumed to
be a trusted authority.There is no provision for the
verification of the shares distributed by the Dealer
and also the participants cannot verify the shares dis-
tributed by the other participant during the reconstruc-
tion.The proposed scheme overcome these difficul-
ties.We make use of self pairing and bilinear pairing
for the efficient construction of the scheme.
The proposed scheme is a threshold multi secret
sharing scheme where any number of secrets can
be shared and threshold number of users can recon-
struct the multi secrets.The multi secrets can be recon-
structed in single stage, unlike the multi stage secret
sharing scheme where the secrets are reconstructed
stage by stage.Each participant can verify their se-
cret share, during the secret distribution phase by the
dealer and also verify the shares send by other partic-
ipants during the reconstruction phase to identify the
cheaters.
The proposed scheme consist of the following three
phases
1. Initialization and Secret Sharing.
2. Secret Reconstruction
3. Verification
4.1. Initialization and Secret sharing
In the initialization phase some public parame-
ters are posted on the public bulletin called notice
board which can be accessed by every participant.
Let U1,U2 . . .Un be the n users involved in the secret
sharing and let K1,K2, . . . ,Km be the m secrets to be
shared.
1. The Dealer(D) chooses an Elliptic curve E over
GF(q),q = pr, where p is a large prime such
that DLP and ECDLP in GF(q) is hard. D then
choose E[l] ⊆ E(GF(qk)), a torsion subgroup
of large prime order l.
2. D chooses a generating pair {G,H} ∈ E[l] and
α,β ∈ [1, l− 1], which is used for pairing and
compute W = α.G+β .H
3. D then publish {E,q, l,k,G,H,W} in the notice
board.
4. A secret point P0 is chosen where P0 = a0.G+
b0.H
5. The Dealer then construct a polynomial of de-
gree t− 1 .
f (x)= a0+a1x1+a2x2+ · · ·+at−2xt−2+b0xt−1
where a0 and b0 corresponds to the point P0 and
the other coefficient values are chosen from Zl∗
6. D compute shares Si = f (xi)( mod l) ,and send
the shares Pi = (xi,Si) secretly to the users Ui
for i = 1, . . . ,n.
7. The dealer also publishes the values c,d corre-
sponds to a point Q = c.G+ d.H and the ver-
ification point Vi = eα ,β (Pi,Q) for i = 1, . . . ,n
corresponds to each share and also V0 =
eα ,β (P0,Q).
8. Publish the recovery code Ri = Ki − e(P0, i.P0)
for i = 1, . . . ,m, corresponds to each secret that
is to be shared.
4.2. Secret Reconstruction
1. When the threshold number of users want to
reconstruct the secret , they pool the shares
and reconstruct the polynomial f (x) using La-
grange Interpolation.
f (x) =
t
∑
j=1
S j ∏
1≤i≤t,i6= j
x− xi
x j− xi
2. From the reconstructed polynomial a0 and b0
can be obtained and hence P0 can be obtained.
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3. Using the published recovery codes , the m se-
crets can be recovered by
Ki = Ri + e(P0, i.P0)
for i = 1, . . . ,m
4.3. Verification
Each user can verify the shares using the share ver-
ification point Vi.
1. Each user compute vi = eα ,β (Pi,Q) using his
share and the public value Q
2. If the computed value vi =Vi, the share send by
the Dealer is valid.
During the reconstruction stage, the validity of the
shares send by each user can be verified by using
the same technique mentioned above.Also the consis-
tency of the shares are verified by checking V0.That is,
after all the shares are pooled , the polynomial is re-
constructed.Using a0,b0,and the generators G,H, P0
can be obtained.The participant can verify the con-
sistency of the shares by checking V0 = v0 , where
v0 = eα ,β (P0,Q), and V0 is the corresponding pub-
lished value.
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
One of the major requirement of the secret sharing
scheme is the consistency of the shares.
Theorem 1 The probability that the Dealer distribute
inconsistent shares to the participant is negligible.
proof. The coefficients of the polynomial f (x) are
chosen by the dealer.The values of xi are chosen such
that the inverse must exist.How ever the Dealer can-
not send invalid shares to the participants. Because
the share (xi,Si) can be verified by each participant
using self pairing with the public value Q.Also the
consistency of the shares can be verified by checking
eα ,β (P0,Q) = V0.If the shares are inconsistent, then
the computed value will not match with V0.
Theorem 2 The probability that the participant dis-
tribute invalid shares during the reconstruction is
negligible.
proof. Each participant can verify the shares send by
the other participants by checking eα ,β (Pi,Q) =Vi, if
there is a mismatch the participant is a cheater and we
are able to detect and identify the cheater.
Theorem 3 Adversary cannot derive any informa-
tion about the secret from the public values.
proof. The polynomial f (x) is of degree t − 1, so
less than t participant cannot derive any useful infor-
mation about the secret by pooling their shares.The
verification code Vi = eα ,β (Pi,Q) cannot reveal any
info about the share Pi.The point Vi is a linear com-
bination of the generator (G,H), and the coefficients
can be any value from the field Z∗l . the public val-
ues Ri also cannot give any information about the
shared secret.The non degeneracy of pairing ensures
that e(P0,P0) is a primitive lth root of unity for all non
zero P0 ∈ E(Fq)[l].
Theorem 4 Finding P0 is as difficult as guessing the
secret.
proof. The security of the system depends on finding
P0 and is again depends on a0 and b0. These values
can be retrieved only by reconstructing the t − 1 de-
gree polynomial by the t users involved in secret re-
construction.The shares have the same size as these
parameters and are elements of the same field.This
provides information theoretical security. Less than
t participant cannot derive any useful information be-
cause of the security of Shamir’s scheme. Hence the
adversary can only guess the values. The probabil-
ity is 1/l, and is negligible when l is large.Finding P0
without knowing a0 and b0 is again like trying all lin-
ear combinations of the generators G and H, which
is again a more complex process.Without knowing P0
finding the secret from the public parameter Ri is as
complex as guessing the secret.
6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
SAGE and Python are used for implementing the
scheme.A simple example showing sharing of two
secrets K1,K2 according to (2,3) threshold scheme
is mentioned here.We considered field with smaller
prime power for easy understanding.
6.1. Initialization
1. Elliptic Curve defined by E : y2 = x3 + 4.x
over Finite Field in i of size 476 is cho-
sen for secret sharing.The order of E
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is 10779422976(28.34.72.1032).Additive
Abelian group isomorphic to Z/103824 +
Z/103824 is embedded in Abelian group of
points on the curve.
2. The dealer D chooses a torsion subgroup
E[103] ⊆ E(GF(476)). Two randomly chosen
generator pairs G,H of E[103] are
G = (19i5 + 38i4+ 26i3 + 28i2+ 45i+ 6 :
20i5 + 18i4 + 12i3+ 32i2 + 12i+ 43 : 1)
H = (5i5 + 8i4 + 41i3 + 46i2+ 39i+ 34 :
32i5 + 7i4 + 18i3 + 34i2+ 8i+ 32 : 1)
Let α = 51,β = 35 , compute W = α.G+β .H
W = (25i5 + 3i4 + 11i3 + 15i2+ 39i+ 19 :
40i5 + 41i4+ 9i3 + 44i2 + 22i+ 1 : 1)
3. E : y2 = x3 + 4.x,q = 476, l = 103,k = 1,α =
51,β = 35,W = (25i5 + 3i4 + 11i3 + 15i2 +
39i+19 : 40i5 +41i4+9i3+44i2+22i+1 : 1)
are made public.
6.2. Share Distribution
1. The matrix A for a (2,3) scheme is of size 3×2
A =

 1 11 2
1 3


2. Dealer chooses two pairs of random numbers
from [1,102] a1′= 11,a2′= 25,b1′= 15,b2′=
33 and compute
A× [a1′,a2′] = [36,61,86] = [a1,a2,a3]
A× [b1′,b2′] = [48,81,114] = [b1,b2,b3]
3. The three users U1,U2,U3 will get shares P1 =
(36,48),P2 = (61,81),P3 = (86,114).
6.3. Secret Sharing
1. We consider two secrets K1 and K2 to be
shared.These secrets are mapped into Elliptic
curve points M1 and M2.
M1 = (19i5 + 38i4 + 26i3+ 28i2 + 45i+ 6 :
20i5 + 18i4 + 12i3+ 32i2 + 12i+ 43 : 1)
M2 = (5i5 + 8i4 + 41i3 + 46i2+ 39i+ 34 :
32i5 + 7i4 + 18i3+ 34i2 + 8i+ 32 : 1)
2. In order to share the two secrets,D chooses
two random pairs of numbers (c1,d1),(c2,d2)∈
[0, l − 1] and compute Qi = ci.G + di.H for
the two secrets.Dealer computes pairing Ri =
eα ,β (Qi,Pi′) + Mi corresponds to each secret,
where Pi′= ai′.G+ bi′.H.
Let c1 = 15,d1 = 11,c2 = 23,d2 = 39 and a1′=
11,b1′= 15,a2′= 25,b2′= 33.
R1 = e51,35(Q1,P1′)
R1 = (c1b1′− d1a1′)(αG+β H)+M1
R1 = (15.15− 11.11).W +M1
R1 = (i5 + 27i4+ 5i3 + 7i2 + 35i+ 38 :
21i5 + 44i4+ 28i3 + 15i2+ 9i+ 16 : 1)
R2 = e51,35(Q2,P2′)
R2 = (c2b2′− d2a2′)(αG+β H)+M2
R2 = (23.33− 25.39).W +M2
R2 = (33i5 + 43i4+ 20i3 + 17i2+ 39i+ 33 :
45i5 + 5i4 + 43i3+ 24i2 + 41i+ 38 : 1)
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3. Publish
{c1,d1,R1} = {15,11,(i5+ 27i4 + 5i3 + 7i2
+35i+ 38 :
21i5 + 44i4 + 28i3+ 15i2
+9i+ 16 : 1)}
{c2,d2,R2} = {23,39,(33i5+ 43i4 + 20i3 + 17i2
+39i+ 33 :
45i5 + 5i4 + 43i3 + 24i2+
41i+ 38 : 1)}
6.4. Secret Reconstruction
Assume that participants P1 and P2 want to recon-
struct the secrets K1,K2.
1. Each participant compute his share contribution
for the reconstruction of each secret as
Si j = eα ,β (Qi,Pi)
S11 = e51,35(Q1,P1)
S11 = (c1.b1− d1.a1).W
S11 = (15.48− 11.36).W
S11 = (8i5 + 5i4 + 2i3 + 29i2 + 13i+ 7 :
4i5 + 29i4+ 44i3 + 43i2+ 6i+ 20 : 1)
S12 = e51,35(Q1,P2)
S12 = (15.81− 11.61).W
S12 = (37i5 + 28i4 + 31i3 + 15i2+ 40i+ 44 :
38i5 + 5i4 + 3i3 + 39i2 + 26i+ 8 : 1)
S21 = (5i5 + 36i4+ 31i3 + 34i2 + 5i+ 38 :
5i5 + 22i4+ 13i3 + 4i2 + 39i+ 17 : 1)
S22 = (25i5 + 3i4 + 11.i3 + 15i2 + 39i+ 19 :
7i5 + 6i4 + 38i3+ 3i2 + 25i+ 46 : 1)
2. The shares generated are then multi-casted.
3. The inverse of the matrix A is
(
2 −1
−1 1
)
.Each user then compute yk.Si j.
T1 = 2S11− 1S12
T1 = (25i5 + 3i4 + 11i3 + 15i2+ 39i+ 19 :
40i5 + 41i4+ 9i3 + 44i2 + 22i+ 1 : 1)
T2 = −1S21 + 1S22
T2 = (29i5 + 43i4 + 19i3+ 20i2 + 36i+ 25 :
45i5 + 9i4 + 29i3+ 15i2 + 9i+ 31 : 1)
4. Each participant can download Ri from the pub-
lic bulletin and reconstruct Mi = Ri−Ti.
M1 = R1−T1
M1 = (19i5 + 38i4 + 26i3+ 28i2 + 45i+ 6 :
20i5 + 18i4+ 12i3 + 32i2 + 12i+ 43 : 1)
M2 = R2−T2
M2 = (5i5 + 8i4 + 41i3+ 46i2 + 39i+ 34 :
32i5 + 7i4 + 18i3 + 34i2+ 8i+ 32 : 1)
From M1,M2,K1 and K2 can be obtained.
The comparison of various schemes which uses
elliptic curve and bilinear pairing is studied and
is shown in Table 1.We considered recent proposal
of only the threshold multi secret sharing schemes
based on elliptic curve and pairing.Lets consider a
(t,n) threshold multi secret sharing scheme which
can share m secrets.It is found that in Liu’s[33] and
Wang’s[59] scheme, the number of secret that can be
shared is proportional to t.So these schemes are not
suitable for sharing more than t secrets.Wangs scheme
is a modification of Chen’s single secret sharing
scheme.Eslami again modified the Wang’s scheme
.The advantage of our proposed scheme is that, large
number of secret can be shared and also the public
values used are less.Most of the schemes mentioned
in the literature having the share verification prop-
erty.But they use discrete logarithm problem.This ver-
ification code can reveal information about the se-
cret if discrete logarithm problem is tractable. Hence
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Table 1
comparison of various schemes using elliptic curve and pairing
scheme Liu [33] Chen [60] Wang [59] Eslami [15] Proposed
single(ss)/multi secret(ms) ms ss ms ms ms
secrets t 1 t m +n m≥ n
public parameters 5 + 3m 8 +n-t 8+2*n 8+n+m-t 7+n+m
single stage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
verifiability No Yes Yes Yes Yes
cheater detection No Yes No Yes Yes
cheater identification No Yes No Yes Yes
the security of the shared secret also depends on the
hardness of the DLP problem.This is avoided in our
scheme.The verification code does not reveal any in-
formation about the secret and is more secure com-
pared with the existing scheme.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have proposed a novel threshold
multi-secret sharing scheme based on elliptic curve
and bilinear pairing .Most of the scheme proposed
in the literature use bilinear pairing for verification
of shares or identification of cheating.We have used
the method of point sharing and verification using
self pairing.A non degenerate Tate pairing or modified
Weil pairing can be used to share multiple secrets.The
number of public parameters are greatly reduced and
the security does not depend on the hard computa-
tional problem.The verification mechanism can pre-
vent users from cheating. Also the consistency of the
shares can be verified by the participants which avoids
the need of a trusted dealer.The proposed scheme is
the first multi secret sharing scheme with the extended
capabilities of share verification and cheater identifi-
cation based on self pairing.The use of elliptic curve
and self pairing can be further explored to develop
secret sharing schemes with more generalized access
structure.
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